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SENATE

{ REPORT
No. 1058 }

REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN
SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

MADE BY ITS

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES
AND ESCAPEES

PURSUANT TO

S. RES. 49, EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

TOGETHER WITH

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

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REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

MARCH 4, 1966.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

INTRODUCTION—RÉSUMÉ OF EVENTS AND TESTIMONY

Pursuant to Senate Resolution 49, agreed to by the Senate February 8, 1965; the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees held hearings and special consultations to investigate the refugee movement and programs of assistance in South Vietnam and Laos. The hearings emphasized the situation in South Vietnam, and this report deals exclusively with problems in that country. The hearings were held July 13, 14, 20, and 27; August 4, 5, 10, and 18; and September 17, 21, 28, 29, and 30, 1965.

The 34 witnesses included the Honorable Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and former Ambassador to Laos; the Honorable Rutherford M. Poats, Assistant Administrator for Far East, Agency for International Development (AID); the Honorable Herbert J. Waters, Assistant Administrator for Material Resources, AID; the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam; Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, former Ambassador to South Vietnam; the Honorable John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; additional officials in Government; academic specialists; and representatives of various private voluntary agencies with programs of assistance in South Vietnam. [A complete list of witnesses appears in the appendix.]

In recent years the subcommittee has frequently noted the mounting refugee problems in Asia and urged that adequate assistance be forthcoming from the international community. The subcommittee's concern for developments in Asia, especially in South Vietnam and Laos, was emphasized in a special report on refugees from communism

in Asia (S. Rept. 59, 89th Cong., 1st sess.), released on February 9, 1965. This concern was reiterated in a subsequent report (S. Rept. 371, 89th Cong., 1st sess.), released on June 25, 1965. Sensing the growing seriousness of the refugee problem in South Vietnam, in the latter report the subcommittee included a general recommendation as follows:

The dramatic flow of terrorized refugees from Communist-dominated areas of South Vietnam reflects the great variety of problems confronting the United States in Asia.

The subcommittee believes that adequate assistance, including resettlement, to these refugees is an integral part of the effort to safeguard the independence of South Vietnam—for humanitarian, as well as political, military, and economic reasons. Commensurate with the varied demands of this effort, no activity should be spared to assist the victims of aggression and terror in South Vietnam.

The subcommittee's hearings were geared to clarifying the situation in South Vietnam, and to finding reasonable, cooperative, and effective answers to the basically humanitarian problems which had arisen in that belabored country. In his opening statement on July 13, 1965, the chairman included the following comment:

I strongly believe that assistance to refugees is an integral part of American policies in Asia—for humanitarian reasons in the first instance, but also to further this Nation's two-pronged effort to create conditions of security from direct and indirect aggression, and to improve conditions of stability and progress among the Asian peoples.

In the context of President Johnson's development plans for Asia, refugee needs in South Vietnam offer a significant opportunity for the United States to engender the hope of a better future in the lives of Vietnam's citizens.

These hearings are a factfinding inquiry into the refugee problem in South Vietnam. We are concerned with conditions in Communist-dominated areas, the specific causes and nature of the refugee flow, its political-military significance, Communist activities related thereto, and the adequacy and effectiveness of assistance programs.

The first day's witnesses, Ambassador Unger and Mr. Poats, discussed the historical background to the refugee problems in South Vietnam and Laos, the general views of the governments concerned, and the programs of assistance carried out by governmental and private voluntary agencies. On the care of refugees in South Vietnam, Ambassador Unger made the following comment:

Basic responsibility for caring for these refugees lies, of course, with the South Vietnamese Government. As part of its continuing program, the Government has recently released to the provincial governments, 4.7 million piasters (the equivalent of \$783,000) for refugee relief. Each refugee receives allowances for food, blankets, mosquito nets, cloth, and adequate shelter. Allowances are adequate, but are limited to providing necessities in order to avoid attracting refugees unnecessarily.

Both the State Department and AID estimated that some 400,000 South Vietnamese were in refugee status at the commencement of the subcommittee's hearings on July 13, 1965. Additionally, there was some awareness that the number of refugees was growing, and that the prospects of the refugees' early return to their homes was slight.

The subcommittee was informed that no accurate financial figures could be given on AID contributions for aid to refugees "since the current program dealing with the present refugees is handled in such a variety of ways, through so many channels of aid assistance, and the Vietnamese Government assistance in turn supported by AID."

The subcommittee was also informed that U.S. efforts to help deal with the growing number of refugees were being handled on a part-time and generally sporadic basis by U.S. personnel in South Vietnam. There was little planning or administrative involvement by the U.S. mission with the appropriate South Vietnamese Cabinet ministries.

As testified by Ambassador Unger and Mr. Poats, the refugee camps and program were administered by the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare, "through their own staff in the field or sent from Saigon working in cooperation with the provincial government, provincial chiefs, and in the case of a few cities, such as Da Nang, with the mayor." AID provincial representatives were incidentally involved in the day-to-day task of caring for the dispossessed.

On July 14, 1965, representatives of CARE, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, International Voluntary Services, and the Mennonite Central Committee, testified concerning the refugee problem and agency programs in South Vietnam. Their testimony was less optimistic than that of the earlier Government witnesses. The agency representatives expressed concern regarding the growing number of refugees, as well as the lack of planning, coordination, and direction in existing programs of assistance.

The representative of CARE emphasized that security problems prevented his organization from helping distressed people in many areas of greatest need. Other witnesses stated the need for military or Government assistance in helping people in the insecure areas of South Vietnam. All witnesses stressed the logistics problem in the movement of supplies to refugee areas. The representatives of Catholic Relief Services and the Mennonite Central Committee discussed the lack of coordination and adequate planning. The representative of the International Rescue Committee stated that AID programs had fallen behind the increased pace of the refugee flow, and was inadequate to help meet the problems created by displaced persons. Additionally, he cited a lack of press concern and public attention in the United States, to the problems and plight of the refugees.

The representative of International Voluntary Services pointed out the lack of public knowledge regarding the voluntary agency programs in South Vietnam, and the difficulties his organization was having in filling an AID contract for 80 workers. Only half that number had been recruited. International Voluntary Services, especially, stressed the urgent need for long-term developmental programs in agriculture, education, and other areas.

Subsequent to the voluntary agency representatives, Mr. Waters testified on the availability of material resources in South Vietnam, and the logistics problem. He said the government was aware of the situation and was taking steps to remedy it. Mr. Waters also recognized

the need for better coordination and direction of refugee assistance by all parties concerned. He expressed the belief that the newly formed coordinating council of representatives from the U.S. mission, the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare, and the voluntary agencies, was a step in the right direction. He expressed some concern over the extent to which the U.S. mission relied on the administratively weak South Vietnamese Government. Mr. Waters also ventured the opinion that the flow of refugees was decreasing. He did not feel, however, that estimates could be given on refugee numbers in the coming months.

On July 27, 1965, Ambassador Unger and Mr. Poats were recalled before the subcommittee. Ambassador Unger had just returned from a brief visit to South Vietnam. The tenor of their testimony displayed no sense of urgency on the part of our Government regarding the refugee problem. For example, this exchange took place between the chairman and Ambassador Unger:

Senator KENNEDY. Now you must have observed while you were there, that there has been a stepup in the bombing of certain villages, with a corresponding increase in the number of refugees. It seems to me that in considering the political-military situation in Vietnam, there has not been great enough recognition of, or sensitivity to, the problem of refugees. I think that when you have 500,000 or 600,000 people who are refugees, there is certainly a political question, and if there has not been any additional consideration of either the needs or the attitudes of refugees by our mission, I would be surprised as well as concerned.

Ambassador UNGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, the care of the refugees is something that is primarily in the hands of the Vietnamese Government. And from the discussions of the subject and from regular reports that we have had from the area, we are satisfied that the refugees are getting at least a minimum amount of care, and that, as I say, where possible, they are being retrained and any kind of work found for them.

In a later exchange, the matter of U.S. efforts to enlist the humanitarian aid of other countries was discussed. Both Ambassador Unger and Mr. Poats indicated that, in the main, U.S. efforts in this regard were indirect—in support of requests for aid made by the South Vietnamese Government.

In response to a question from the chairman regarding the number of American personnel involved in the refugee program, Mr. Poats answered:

Our general principle is to make it as small as possible, to try to avoid American presence to the extent we can.

On August 4 and 5, the representatives from additional voluntary agencies, and a member of the U.S. Public Health Service, who recently returned from South Vietnam, testified. The agencies included International Social Service, Foster Parents' Plan, Inc., and the People to People Health Foundation.

At least the following items were developed by these witnesses:

(1) There are approximately 800 South Vietnamese doctors, of whom 500 are in the army, 150 treat only private-paying patients, and 150 are available for the 15 to 16 million citizens of South Vietnam.

(2) Cholera cases increased in South Vietnam from a few hundred in 1963 to over 20,000 in 1964. Malaria incidents are also increasing.

(3) There are 28 provincial hospitals in South Vietnam in which surgical suites have been constructed. Only 11 of these hospitals were being used, because additional medical personnel were unavailable.

(4) There is a lack of linen and sterilizers in many South Vietnamese hospitals.

(5) There is a general shortage of trained nurses, some surgical teams having none. One witness, however, cited an example of nurses available at \$26 per month, but no funds were released to pay their salaries.

(6) There is only one school of social work in all of South Vietnam. This school had been inoperative for 3 years, but had recently been reopened with an 18-month program, which is expected to produce some 40 graduates per term. Many social workers are needed in South Vietnam.

(7) International Social Service and Foster Parents' Plan programs have been severely curtailed because the agencies lack social workers, especially Vietnamese.

(8) Over 10,000 children were living in some 63 overcrowded and inadequate orphanages. Thousands more were being housed in refugee camps or hospitals.

(9) Many children were separated from parents and relatives and treated as orphans merely because trained social workers were not available to question them, and after gathering information, to reunite them with family and relatives.

(10) No program of rehabilitation had been established for the growing number of amputees until late summer.

The subcommittee's initial hearings helped to stimulate in the executive branch an awareness that the refugee problem was serious, and that the needs of distressed civilians in South Vietnam were not being adequately met. On August 17, in a letter to the subcommittee's general counsel, Mr. Walter G. Stoneman, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Far East, AID, outlined several steps taken to express better our Government's active concern for refugees in South Vietnam:

(1) An interagency task force was being constituted in Saigon for an "intensified U.S. appraisal of and action on the refugee problem."

(2) The Saigon AID mission had organized a new "operational task force of about six persons in Saigon and nine in the provinces with high refugee populations to give full-time attention to this problem."

(3) The mission requested AID in Washington to recruit additional refugee and support personnel for a permanent refugee office of about 10 people to work in and with the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare.

(4) New efforts were being made to increase the scope and effectiveness of the voluntary agency programs in South Vietnam.

(5) AID for the first time proposed giving direct U.S. assistance to the voluntary agencies as required.

(6) In a number of related AID activities, progress was reported in improving port facilities, coastal shipping and airlift capabilities, and rural medical programs.

In August, both Ambassador-designate Lodge and General Taylor testified before the subcommittee. Ambassador Lodge's testimony took place largely in executive session. He expressed concern for the refugee problem, and pledged the U.S. mission in Saigon would give greater attention to this growing movement of people in South Vietnam.

In his prepared text, General Taylor took the following position on the refugee question:

As in many fields of joint endeavor, we often want to move faster and more efficiently than the responsible Vietnamese officials appear capable of doing, and are uncertain whether to take over the job ourselves or accept a slow rate of progress. It is my view that we should never accept responsibility for this refugee problem, but should continue to make our contributions through advice, suggestion, and the provision of resources to the responsible ministries of the Government.

Mr. McNaughton subsequently testified before the subcommittee. He discussed the causes of the refugee flow, Vietcong tactics against the people, and the sensitivity of the military to the plight and suffering of noncombatants. Among other things he said that "in 1964, 1,729 civic officials were killed, kidnaped, or wounded by the Vietcong. In the same year, 11,746 plain civilians were killed, wounded, or kidnaped." He pointed out this terror campaign continued intensely during 1965.

In response to a question concerning the need for able government officials in the contested areas of South Vietnam, Mr. McNaughton stated:

This is the big problem in South Vietnam, that the Communist technique is not to win, it is to cause us to lose. The Communist plan is to cut away at the sensitive parts of an organic structure of the government so it cannot function and so the people get exhausted and throw in the sponge. The way to do that is to kill off the good leaders and make it impossible to get the leadership you need.

Throughout the summer of 1965, there was a great deal of discussion relative to publicizing humanitarian needs in South Vietnam among the American people, to finding better ways for our citizens to express their active concern for the distressed people of South Vietnam, and to coordinating humanitarian efforts among private organizations in this country.

In late August and September, press reports indicated that a plan was under consideration in the executive branch for the creation of a private, but officially sponsored, foundation to serve as a focal point and umbrella for the fundraising and programing efforts of the voluntary agencies and other groups actively concerned with humanitarian needs in South Vietnam. This reported plan was among the items discussed by the representatives of several voluntary agencies who appeared before the subcommittee on September 21. The agencies included the Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, International Rescue Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee.

Testimony indicated, that while the agencies already involved in South Vietnam welcomed the support and efforts of additional groups,

they opposed the creation of a superimposed umbrella organization for several reasons, including the traditional independence of the individual agencies, and their separate programing and fund-raising procedures. Moreover, there was general agreement that the existing American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service could effectively serve the need for cooperative and coordinated efforts among the private agencies.

The hearing also produced the following items:

(1) Several agencies were engaged in fund-raising campaigns and were expanding their programs in South Vietnam. Other agencies, for example, the American Friends Service Committee, were contemplating programs.

(2) The voluntary agencies anticipated some 1 million refugees by the end of 1965.

(3) A substantial bottleneck in the movement of supplies into refugee areas had developed. The shipping priority of refugee supplies was low, and commodities, including food, were piling up on the docks. There were, however, few cases of starvation.

(4) The rapid influx of refugees in some areas was an additional cause for food shortages. Medicines, clothing, cooking utensils, and other items were in short supply in some areas.

(5) There was a great need for trained refugee personnel.

(6) The only school of social welfare in Vietnam, which recently reopened, was hampered by a lack of trained personnel and other factors, such as inflation and the diversion of funds to other programs.

(7) About one-half of the registered refugees were in camps. The remainder were being absorbed into urban areas to which they fled.

(8) The refugee camps, by and large, contained a series of long hutlike buildings to house refugees. The buildings were divided into single rooms with dirt floors, bamboo sides, and aluminum roofing. Health conditions were poor. Sanitation facilities and the water supply were often inadequate.

(9) The refugees were mostly children, women, older persons. There were few men ranging from 16 to 40 years old.

(10) Some efforts were being made to fill the medical need with Cuban refugee doctors, nurses, and corpsmen.

(11) In many parts of Vietnam, young people were without any form of organized education, vocational training, self-help programs or the like.

Additional testimony by voluntary agency representatives, on September 28, brought out the following information:

(1) International Voluntary Services was operating an educational program in South Vietnam on the provincial school level. Some 20 American youths were teaching in this program.

(2) International Voluntary Services personnel were training some Vietnamese teachers, but additional training personnel was needed.

(3) International Voluntary Services was conducting a drive among college and university students for additional personnel, but was hampered by a lack of publicity on humanitarian needs in South Vietnam, and a lack of knowledge on the part of the public regarding private assistance efforts.

(4) A program was organized in the summer of 1965 to send 5,000 South Vietnamese students and teachers into the countryside to participate in road construction, teaching, simple medical activities, and recreational programs.

(5) The school facilities in South Vietnam are often adequate for 10 percent or less of the students. Many students, therefore, cannot continue their studies.

(6) AID has established several trade schools, special training centers, and elementary schools since 1955, but the number of schools is vastly inadequate.

(7) Few schools exist for refugee children, and apparently no educational program was being planned for these children. AID was aware of the problem, but no action was being taken.

(8) The medical recruitment program, Project Vietnam, had had a response from some 437 doctors who were willing to volunteer services in South Vietnam for 2 months or longer. Despite administrative "redtape" and disputes between the project head and AID representatives, the contract to supply some 120 doctors was being carried out.

(9) AID operated a pilot program during the summer for U.S. college students in 1965, sending 20 students to South Vietnam for work in educational and other civic action programs. The program was successful, but as of late summer, no decision had been made whether or not to repeat the program in 1966.

On September 29, the subcommittee heard Mr. Stoneman and three AID personnel who had served in South Vietnam, and were about to return. They discussed the overall AID program and day-to-day operations in several provinces.

To conclude its hearings, the subcommittee, on September 30, heard two prominent members of the academic community, Prof. Roger Hilsman, of Columbia University, and Dr. Wesley R. Fishel, of Michigan State University. Both witnesses stressed that the refugees should be viewed as a challenge rather than a problem, as an opportunity to produce nation-builders and to broaden the base of popular allegiance to the Saigon government. Professor Hilsman stated:

The broad principles of an effective counter guerrilla program are * * * giving the people physical protection, establishing simple government services, helping them to defend and help themselves—showing them above all else that the government cares. There have been many occasions in history when large-scale guerrilla terrorism has been defeated—in the Philippines, in Malaya, in South Korea, to name only a few recent instances—and in every one the successful program combined these principles * * *.

The refugees are, in my judgment, a key to such a program. * * * What I am suggesting is that the refugee program should not be just to feed, house, and care for these people, but to train them for the job of making their villages guerrillaproof when they return—to train them as village defenders, as schoolteachers, medical technicians, agricultural advisers and so on. If an imaginative, positive effort is made, in sum, the refugees can become the vanguard of a peaceful revolution in the Vietnamese countryside sponsored by the free world—which is the only way that the bloody, Communist revolution can be circumvented.

Dr. Fishel made the following comments on the refugees:

Thus far I believe the military regime in Saigon has failed to grasp the tremendous implications of this flood of humanity which now threatens to engulf it. If this refugee problem is badly handled, these people * * * could further intensify the political instability of South Vietnam and create even greater problems for the Government than it now faces.

If this situation is treated with some intelligence, then these 600,000 refugees of the moment could become a major asset to the Vietnamese Government, which I think we all agree badly needs a sturdy base of popular support. * * * If these people are handled well the Saigon government is going to secure the manifest loyalty which it needs. And I would suggest that this is something which demands immediate attention and the most careful consideration.

A. WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

There is little doubt that history will mark the conflict in South Vietnam as a classic example of Communist aggression through wars of national liberation. Insurgency warfare is old in the annals of history, but in recent times has been a primary vehicle in the efforts of Communist forces to extend their influence and control throughout the world. Examples include the Greek civil war, the Chinese civil war, the Malaya emergency, the Burmese civil wars, the HUK rebellion in the Philippines, the Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and Vietcong insurgencies in southeast Asia, and the Castro revolution in Cuba. Communist-led insurgents have threatened stability and progress in other countries as well, and continue to do so, notably in Thailand and areas of Africa and Latin America.

Lenin provides the genesis for the theory and practice of Communist insurgency warfare, and the strategic and tactical prescriptions for this accelerated form of conflict in the mid-20th century. Major contributions to the development of this theory have been made by Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto Guevara. Accepting Clausewitz' dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," they emphasize the political facet of guerrilla warfare, and graft socioeconomic and ideological concepts to military tactics.

Wars of national liberation are revolutionary efforts to undermine and destroy existing governments and their socioeconomic orders, and to replace them with a Communist-led new order. As in Laos and South Vietnam, the insurgents press their purpose through a combination of political action, subversion, military action, and terrorism—through determined but protracted conflict, during which the authority and infrastructure of an incumbent regime will systematically erode.

The insurgents are guided by a central principle—the ideological mobilization of the masses, the complicity of the people. It is they who bear the brunt of Communist strategy and tactics—the peasants in the countryside, the workers in the city, the civil servants in the government, the students in the schools. It is they who leave their homes as refugees from developing insurgency, or from the conflict produced by counteraction on the part of the government. The care and protection of the refugees and their fellow citizens in distress is inevitably a key task for the threatened government and its allies.

B. REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(1) REFUGEES FROM NORTH VIETNAM, 1954-55

Refugees have been an important element in South Vietnam for more than a decade—ever since the partition of Vietnam by the Geneva accords of July 1954. In subsequent months nearly 7 percent of the population of North Vietnam, some 1 million persons, sought refuge from communism in the southern part of this former French colony.

It is sure that additional numbers would have come, had they not been prevented from leaving by the Communist authorities of North Vietnam after the lapse of the 300-day period for free departure permitted by the Geneva accords. Because of the effective control system throughout the country, and the physical difficulties of the exit routes, few persons have escaped from North Vietnam over the last decade.

The refugees, mostly peasants, many of whom had experienced life under communism in Viet Minh controlled areas during the Indochina war, fled largely for political reasons. They were fleeing from communism. A substantial number of the refugees were Roman Catholic, often led into exile by their religious leaders. But all who left chose to abandon their homes and most of their possessions, and by foot and by oxcart made the long trek from Viet Minh rule in the north to the free republic in the south. By 1957, the Government of South Vietnam, with the assistance of the American Government and several private voluntary agencies, had largely completed the important task of caring for these refugees, and integrating them into the society and economy of their new country.

(2) THE CURRENT PROBLEM

While the task of integrating refugees from North Vietnam was underway, indigenous and foreign Communist-led cadre initiated their plan to subjugate South Vietnam, by creating a basis for insurgency through political organization and subversion. Vietcong terror and guerrilla warfare followed, beginning in earnest in 1959. As this war of national liberation gained momentum, its reign of terror claimed an increasingly heavy toll of local officials and ordinary citizens. It gnawed at South Vietnam's village structure and caused deterioration in the political, economic, and social fabric of the countryside. Inevitably, the situation produced refugees who fled in growing numbers from insecure areas, seeking safety and assistance in or near district and provincial capitals.

It is difficult to estimate the number of displaced persons in the early stages of the Vietnam conflict, and what, if any, assistance was given to them. The record would indicate that the situation of these people was largely ignored. Conditions were not unlike those which existed during the Indochina war, when peasants temporarily fled from areas of conflict, or, if they remained displaced,

were subsequently absorbed in less hazardous areas or in the larger towns and cities. But as Communist pressures increased and expanded throughout the countryside, the number of refugees grew accordingly. In 1962-63, for example, nearly 150,000 mountain tribes people (Montagnards) fled from Vietcong-dominated areas in the mountains of central Vietnam. They were immediately rendered large-scale emergency and resettlement assistance, channeled by AID through the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare. In late 1964, the number of displaced persons was greatly compounded by thousands who were driven from their villages by devastating floods and typhoons.

Last year, 1965, the number of refugees vastly increased. Their number was estimated, by reliable authorities, to be some 200,000 in the early months of the year. By midyear this number had risen sharply to nearly 400,000. It was more than 600,000 in September, and nearly a million by the end of the year.

Although refugees exist throughout South Vietnam, the dimensions of the problem vary from province to province. Large concentrations exist, especially, in coastal provinces along the South China Sea. Official South Vietnamese estimates, which tend to deflate the refugee problem, indicate that during 1965, the refugee population found in these provinces was as follows:

Quang Nam (39,421), Quang Ngai (82,873), Quang Tin (14,111), Quang Tri (14,350), Binh Dinh (129,202), Khanh Hoa (19,854), Ninh Thuan (20,382), Phu Yen (44,689), Bien Hoa (11,462), An Xuyen (14,118), Ba Xuyen (12,409), and Long An (13,573).

Significant numbers are also found in the following provinces:

Darlac (24,028), Khanh Hoa (19,854), Kontum (22,293), Ninh Thuan (20,382), Phu Bon (15,134), Binh Duong (13,936), Long Khanh (11,608), Tay Ninh (15,812), Ba Xuyen (12,409), Chuong Thien (10,449), Dinh Tuong (79,269), and Vinh Long (14,567).

According to official South Vietnamese estimates, of the total 772,000 refugees recorded in 1965, some 321,300 have been resettled, or have returned to their villages because of improved security conditions. The official South Vietnamese figures do not include an undetermined number of refugees in the immediate Saigon area, and many others displaced in the interior.

Nearly all the refugees are of peasant stock. Most are children under 16, women, and older persons. There are few able-bodied men between 16 and 40 years of age.

SOUTH VIETNAM THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

JANUARY 9, 1966


TOTAL OF REFUGEES
FROM COMMUNISM **771,054**

REGION I				REGION III			
REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS	REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
BÁNH LŨNG	5,218		5,218	BIÊN HOÀ	11,462	4,419	7,043
QUẢNG NAM	39,481	11,916	12,787	14,718	13,936	899	13,037
ĐOÀT	42,873	19,181	4,694	58,798	1,568	336	1,232
TÂN	14,111	5,000		9,111	9,523	8,516	1,007
TRẠI	14,350	4,260	3,286	6,804	4,227	2,357	2,090
THỪA THIÊN	8,605	4,695		3,910	8,805	3,899	4,906
TOTAL:	104,879	45,052	20,967	98,559	11,608		11,608
				PHƯỚC LONG	3,633	1,459	2,174
				PHƯỚC THÀNH	3,382		387
				PHƯỚC TUY	3,307	3,120	670
				SAIGON	670		670
				TÂY NINH	19,812	5,426	10,386
				VÙNG TÁU	1,537	1,003	534
				TOTAL:	86,488	31,428	55,060

REGION II				REGION IV			
REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS	REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
BÌNH DINH	129,202	37,259		97,943	3,524	5,022	109
BÌNH THUẬN	7,560	2,772		4,788	14,718	10,036	4,682
DARLAC	24,028	8,420		15,608	12,400	6,370	6,030
KHÁNH HOÀ	19,884	1,714		18,170	9,585	3,543	6,042
KONTUM	28,293		1,498	20,445	9,669	3,628	1,041
LÂM ĐỒNG	8,245	4,863		3,382	10,449	3,111	7,338
NINH THUAN	20,382	20,229		153	79,269	9,715	69,554
PHÚC AM	15,154	14,640		494	3,123	2,387	786
PHÚC KHU	44,689	4,172		40,517	9,897	6,189	3,708
QUẢNG ĐỨC	8,367	1,763		6,604	6,736	5,789	947
TUYÊN ĐỨC	5,296	1,475		3,821	3,719	2,621	1,098
TOTAL:	308,636	92,690	1,498	214,948	6,498	3,076	3,422
				LONG AN	13,573	5,943	7,630
				PHONG DINH	6,936	1,587	5,349
				VINH DINH	7,880	2,836	5,044
				VINH LONG	14,667	8,104	6,563
				TOTAL:	211,352	82,115	129,237

TOTALS

TOTAL OF REFUGEES.....771,054
RESETTLED REFUGEES.....251,285
REFUGEES RETURNING
TO NATIVE VILLAGES.....72,035
REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY
SHELTERS.....447,734



LEGEND

[Black Box]	MORE THAN 20,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
[Dark Grey Box]	MORE THAN 8,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
[Medium Grey Box]	MORE THAN 5,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
[White Box]	LESS THAN 5,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS

USOM/PUS ADMIN. DIVISION

NOTE.—The statistics on refugees are supplied by the South Vietnamese Government and in the opinion of the subcommittee the cumulative total of refugees does not reflect many thousands of South Vietnamese who do not find their way on the official refugee roles.
The resettlement figures are inflated since many persons counted as resettled have in fact been shifted from the refugee category to that of military dependents, without having moved from refugee areas.

C. CAUSES OF THE REFUGEE FLOW

What motivates people to flee their villages? How, precisely, does one become a refugee in South Vietnam? As noted above, the motivation of people who left North Vietnam following the Geneva accords, was predominately and overtly political—they were fleeing from communism. The motivation of the refugees who are now leaving insecure and Communist-controlled areas in South Vietnam is more complex—overt political opposition to communism is not so predominantly in evidence, except among the portion of chiefly ethnic North Vietnamese, heavily Catholic, who once more are fleeing from communism. It is most significant, however, that the refugee movement is a one-way street, into Government-controlled areas; and that those who flee the twilight and direct combat zones, look to the Government for security and protection, rather than the Vietcong.

As the hearing record indicates, it is difficult to attribute any accurate number of refugees to a specific cause. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that a major factor is the Vietcong's campaign of terror, assassination, and kidnaping, which over the years has come to envelop the countryside in every province of South Vietnam. Liberality in the application of terror may vary from province to province, from month to month, depending upon the Vietcong's overall strategic necessity and the local exigencies in their effort to insure the complicity of the people. The victims of terror are those who represent or support the Government, and potential opposition—the village officials, the local schoolteacher, specialists in agriculture or health, often the religious leaders, and the dependents of those who fight back. The aim of the Vietcong is to discredit these people, to disrupt the structure of authority, and to cause the villagers to lose faith in the ability of the Government to protect and serve them.

Intimidation of the people through terrorist tactics is carefully combined with a very well developed technique of wooing their support by soliciting their complaints against the Government. The insurgents seek to persuade the people of the justice of the Vietcong cause, and to illustrate its ability to meet the needs of the people. But out of fear and disenchantment, out of secret loyalty to the Government, there are always those who choose to flee. This is particularly true when overt oppression accompanies terror, or follows it—after the Vietcong has eliminated Government authority and established a dominant position through military occupation, and, in some areas, the institution of what Ambassador Unger termed "a fully developed governmental structure." Harassment of ordinary citizens, the confiscation of local food supplies and other material to support Vietcong units, the imposition of heavy taxation, and the impressment of young men to serve in regular or guerrilla units or to serve as porters in carrying loads from one part of the country to another—give reason enough for the peasants to flee. The sharp increase in refugee movement during 1965 is directly related to the Vietcong's major

escalation of oppression in the countryside—to help satisfy their own need for men and supplies, to intensify the process of demoralization, and to enforce the complicity of the people.

A second major cause of increased refugees is the general escalation of military conflict. Many villages are caught in the crossfire of battle, inevitably resulting in the loss of life and widespread destruction of homes and community facilities. Some areas, containing Vietcong bases and substantial fortifications, are subjected to bombing attacks by Government or American aircraft. The anticipation—often because of advance warning by the Government—or experience of military action has driven thousands from their villages to areas secured by the Government. Undoubtedly, areas of military action are a primary source of refugees. Testimony before the subcommittee indicates that in some refugee centers, available medical teams spend most of their time caring for war casualties among civilians.

Throughout the hearings, the chairman expressed a special concern for the care and protection of noncombatants by Government and American forces in areas of military action. In response to questions, Mr. McNaughton, among others, stressed that the military forces are "very sensitive" to this matter. He referred, specifically, to a directive issued on September 7, 1965, by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. This detailed directive, issued to clarify and emphasize U.S. policy, said in part:

These same forces must constantly demonstrate—our forces—their concern for the safety of noncombatants, their compassion for the injured, their willingness to aid and assist the sick, the hungry, and dispossessed.

The subcommittee emphasizes the great importance which it attaches to this policy, and its effective execution by both the United States and South Vietnamese military forces.

D. SOME BASIC FINDINGS

The paragraphs below summarize findings based on the subcommittee's inquiry:

(1) ON GENERAL POLICY MATTERS

As the hearing record and appendices indicate, the refugee situation remained fluid for several weeks relative to specific data on the scope and significance of the problem, the condition and need of the refugees, and the nature and operation of assistance programs carried out by the governments concerned and several cooperating private voluntary agencies.

The subcommittee believes this situation, especially in the early phases of the inquiry, reflects a failure on the part of the Government of South Vietnam, and the United States Government as well, to fully anticipate and prepare for an inevitable byproduct of developing insurgency, to identify readily what was clearly a growing and serious problem, and to initiate adequate programs of assistance commensurate with related exigencies and with recognized policy objectives in the nonmilitary aspects of the Vietnam conflict.

A report filed with the subcommittee by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), and substantiated by testimony in the hearing record, indicates, for example, that the "number of refugees was far in excess of the number expected by AID in its program planning; AID estimates that there was a total of nearly 600,000 refugees during fiscal year 1965 as opposed to the AID mission's earlier planning estimate that there would be only 100,000." The report points out that, in any case, the mission's program made no special provision for refugees, and that when their needs became apparent, it was necessary to divert foodstuffs and other supplies from regular counterinsurgency and direct technical assistance programs. This situation reflected, in part, the operating concept that refugee relief was primarily a function of the South Vietnamese Government.

But little of the funds earmarked for refugee relief in South Vietnam's general budget, supported in large measure by the United States, were actually expended. Out of 369.4 million piasters allocated for refugees during calendar year 1965, only 24.4 million were actually expended as of July 28, 1965. "It appears clear," states the GAO report, "that for a good part of the time in which the refugee problem was becoming increasingly severe, neither the Government of South Vietnam, nor the AID mission was fully aware of its extent or the magnitude to which it would grow."

As the report notes, the inquiry conducted by the subcommittee, and various newspaper articles, were catalysts in galvanizing AID into greater action on behalf of refugees. This action is the subject of a special section in this report. Although activity is also noted on the part of the South Vietnamese Government, the GAO statement declares that, as of late November 1965, the reported intention of the

South Vietnamese Government had not as yet "been implemented in terms of concrete policy determination and instructions to the Vietnamese provincial officials."

The subcommittee recognizes that in the total context of the Vietnam conflict, the refugee flow is only one of many problems. Nevertheless, deep humanitarian concern for the plight of these people, and action geared to the betterment of this significant cross section of South Vietnamese citizens, will be a basic ingredient in the long haul to preserve and strengthen the political independence of South Vietnam. In the handling of the refugee problem, the subcommittee has sensed the absence of an overall strategic concept and program, which adequately integrates the political, economic, and social aspects of the Vietnam conflict with the needed military effort.

(2) ON THE NEED AND CONDITION OF THE REFUGEES

As in all refugee problems, the need of those displaced in South Vietnam is both emergency assistance and longer term rehabilitation. There was a consensus among the witnesses that, in the main, most refugees were being provided at least with the basic essentials—a small monetary allowance, food, blankets, clothing, and shelter, the latter usually built by the refugees themselves with materials supplied by the South Vietnamese Government or the United States mission. This general observation, however, allows for many notable exceptions, particularly among clusters of refugees in the interior provinces. Witnesses who visited refugee centers reported that conditions varied widely from center to center—even in providing the basic essentials of emergency relief. Reports indicate there have usually been adequate supplies available within South Vietnam to provide relief for all refugees and others in need. Where the need has not been met, it has been because of the numerous problems cited throughout this report. Especially during the summer months of 1965, the low priority given civilian needs and the lack of facilities to transport supplies into areas of distress, caused acute problems in caring for the refugees.

Witnesses cited several additional, but essential, needs among refugees. They include, for example, the special attention which should be made available to thousands of war orphans. They include medical supplies, equipment, and facilities to treat battle casualties among the refugees, and to prevent the spread of epidemics and disease. They include the need for sanitation facilities and an adequate water supply. They include the need for simple kits of health, hygienic, sewing, or school articles.

Of special concern to the chairman, as well as to several witnesses, was the long-term need of rehabilitation and resettlement—the need for meaningful programs which would restore hope for the dispossessed, as well as keep them alive. The idleness observed by those who visited refugee centers is indicative of the need for the establishment of cottage industries, self-help projects, agricultural development programs, vocational training and other educational centers, fortified resettlement villages, and other channels to encourage industriousness and productive life among the refugees.

The subcommittee emphasizes its belief that every effort must be made to provide schooling, at least through the primary grades, for every refugee child. Education is a precious commodity for most

Vietnamese families. It is estimated, however, that only 15 to 20 percent of the refugee children are presently in school, whereas schools are provided for some 60 to 70 percent of the children in the general population in areas under Government control. Where distance or severe overcrowding make it impossible for refugee children to attend established schools, special interim classrooms and teachers should be added to the regular schools or provided at refugee centers.

Some witnesses stressed that progressive programs should be coupled with efforts to encourage the development of rudimentary, but viable, political structures within the refugee centers, tying them into the provincial and central government system. Such programs are especially applicable to the people of individual hamlets and villages who left as a group under the leadership of their local leaders. The refugees are a cross section of South Vietnamese citizens. Their allegiance to the Government and their productive experience as refugees can become a key element in strengthening their nation, and in contributing to the development and the future security of South Vietnam.

Government witnesses recognized the emergency and long-term need of the refugees and the opportunities present to enhance the political, social, and economic development of South Vietnam. But it is also apparent from the hearing record that, during most of 1965, little was done to develop policy and programs in this area, and to relate them to military strategy and the overall objectives of the South Vietnamese and United States Governments. The subcommittee is keenly aware of the fact that general conditions in South Vietnam greatly hinder the progress that is needed in assisting the political, economic, and social development of the refugees and their fellow citizens. But the subcommittee also believes that the nature of the conflict in South Vietnam requires a tremendous effort on behalf of the people, if the military ventures are not to be in vain.

(3) ON THE PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Serious operational and administrative problems have hampered the formation and implementation of an adequate assistance program for the refugees in South Vietnam. As the hearing record indicates, these problems include the serious lack of trained personnel and adequate facilities, and the generally low priority given refugee and other civilian needs, relating to the allocation, warehousing, and transportation of food commodities and other supplies. Steps taken by the United States and the South Vietnamese Governments since last summer should help remedy these problems.

Of key importance during several months of last year, however, was a general lack of official data regarding the refugee movement, and, therefore, a failure to recognize a serious and growing problem. At the suggestion of the subcommittee, a factfinding inquiry was undertaken in late summer and early fall by AID, through the U.S. mission in Saigon. The initial negativism toward the refugee movement was due in part to the lack of information; but also to an erroneous belief on the part of many officials, both in the United States and South Vietnamese Governments, that whatever refugee movement did exist, was temporary, and would solve itself as the war progressed. Some officials also believed that refugees were in no worse condition than their fellow citizens, which was reason enough for greater concern

regarding creative economic and social programs for all South Vietnamese. Moreover, primary and direct responsibility in refugee matters was reserved for the administratively weak South Vietnamese Government. Until recently, the involvement of the U.S. mission was minimal. This concept, however, was inconsistent with the reality of our involvement in South Vietnam in mid-1965.

Overall responsibility for refugees has resided with the South Vietnamese Ministers of Social Welfare and of Rural Construction. The Provincial chiefs have carried specific responsibility for refugee needs within each Province, largely with funds and materials allocated by the Central Government.

Existing machinery was incapable of handling the massive refugee problem which developed during 1965. The response of the Government of South Vietnam and the United States mission was inevitably an ad hoc proposition, which, given the general situation in the country, initially resulted in much confusion, crash programs, duplication of effort, and lack of creative leadership. The many needs of the refugees swamped officials with the job of simply trying to provide basic shelter and provisions, let alone more meaningful programs of rehabilitation and resettlement. As Mr. Waters noted candidly before the subcommittee last July, "We are in a backstopping position." Hopefully, measures taken since that time are relieving this situation.

The initial lack of policy guidelines and a ready mechanism to handle refugee assistance, caused serious coordinating problems within each government and between them. This was complicated by serious administrative instability within the South Vietnamese Government, and its slow budgetary process. Reportedly, there have also been problems involving corruption within the South Vietnamese bureaucracy, the diversion of funds and materials into unauthorized hands, black marketeering, and the like.

The GAO report stressed the urgent need for operational procedures and for disciplined coordination of all relief efforts to assure that available personnel and resources would be applied promptly, effectively, and economically.

U.S. officials recognized this need and responded readily in trying to organize assistance efforts. By fall of last year, the South Vietnamese Government had also come to recognize the seriousness of the refugee problem and the need for concerted action. But this concern of the Saigon government has been more verbal than actively responsive in terms of substantive programs. The GAO report of November 24, 1965, states that "we did not find in our current inquiry that the reported intentions of the Vietnamese Government have as yet been implemented in terms of concrete policy determination and instructions to the Vietnamese Provincial officials. Such specific actions by the Vietnamese Government, we believe, are essential to the successful prosecution of the [refugee] program." In late September, Dr. Fishel stated that "the Central Government has been very slow to recognize the implications of the [refugee] movement, to take steps of any coordinated sort to deal with the problem that is posed."

Throughout the hearings several witnesses pointed out difficulties in programming which involved the South Vietnamese Province chiefs. Many, for example, are inexperienced in administration. As one

witness states, they "are very fearful about how to do things; they are afraid to be accused of wrong doing and possibly get shot or possibly have their careers ruined." Additionally, Dr. Fishel cited the low morale among many civil servants and, because administrative reform was started but never completed, the lack of "security that comes from having some sort of central civil service establishment." Professor Hilsman noted the lack of general policy guidelines and "an overall central concept" to guide the actions of Provincial officials. Where action has been taken, it has come largely through the initiative of local officials, who developed a Provincial operation and pressed the Central Government for needed funds and assistance. Unfortunately, the Central Government has been wholly ineffective in making its presence felt in those Provinces where local officials have maintained a laissez-faire attitude toward refugees and others in distress.

Some Provincial chiefs, fearing the infiltration of Vietcong cadre among the refugees, have sought to encourage people to remain in their villages, or, if they flee, to encourage their return, meanwhile neglecting the basic needs of those in distress. These officials believe that many relief payments would find their way into Vietcong hands. Still others have neglected the refugees simply because they cannot be bothered by yet another problem, or because they have feared the reaction of the local people.

Some officials are cautious in refugee matters, because they feel a truly adequate program will needlessly encourage the influx of additional people—the "professional refugee." Apparently this feeling has been shared by many U.S. officials. Several witnesses, however, disagreed with this theory. Professor Hilsman commented:

People do not leave their homes for something vague like this, to go into a refugee camp * * *. They leave because they are being bombed, or the Vietcong are coming in and taking their young men and their food, and there is no way to survive there. These people do not behave that way. They are primitive villagers.

Dr. Fishel put it this way:

They do not come out of their villages in the interior for a handout. They have to be driven out by dire necessity, because the land means something to them—the ancestral home and so forth. These are things they do not like to leave. I do not think that we as Americans appreciate, really, this depth of attachment that a Vietnamese peasant has for his land and his village. They really have to be pushed to leave that village and to come 100 miles or so to another area that they do not know.

The testimony indicated that inaction on refugee matters is especially evident among the many military administrators. The situation, however, should not becloud the fact that in many areas of South Vietnam, provincial and local officials are making every effort to aid, effectively, their distressed fellow citizens. Cited at the hearings, for example, were the extraordinary efforts being made by the mayor of Da Nang. Nevertheless, the task is clear. There are many key South Vietnamese officials, at all government levels, who need to be persuaded

of the unique challenge posed by the refugee problem, and the opportunity it gives to help build their country.

As the chairman noted at the hearings, the apparent inability of the South Vietnamese Government to cope with the refugee problem, inevitably raised the question as to how direct a role can be played by the United States in the refugee program without blunting the initiative and strengthening of the South Vietnamese Government. Opinions expressed before the subcommittee generally agreed that the United States role should be as minimal as possible—that with commodity assistance and more active counsel by U.S. officials, the South Vietnamese Government could, in fact, do the job that was needed. General Taylor said:

It is my view that we should never accept responsibility for this refugee problem, but should continue to make our contribution through advice, suggestion, and the provision of resources to the responsible ministries of government. There has almost always been a refugee problem in South Vietnam, and there will probably continue to be one long after we have departed. We will have helped most if we leave behind a class of social-minded, trained administrators capable of showing initiative and independence in looking after their own people.

While the subcommittee is basically in accord with this thinking, it is clear that the role of the United States must be increased. AID appears to have come, in part, to this realization. As the GAO report stated:

The concept which AID has now adopted is to continue to operate through the Government of Vietnam, but on a basis of increased positive AID participation to fill voids in the Government's capabilities. U.S. personnel who will devote full-time attention to refugee matters will be placed at all levels of the administrative structure, including the refugee camps.

The subcommittee concurs in this latter approach.

The subcommittee recognizes that some progress is being made in organizing and implementing programs to assist the distressed people of South Vietnam—especially on the part of AID and the U.S. mission in Saigon. But paper planning is not actuality, and much remains to be done in solidifying a needed offensive to better the lot of the people and stimulate their active allegiance to the Saigon government. In the final analysis, effective action will depend in large measure on the extent to which key South Vietnamese officials, in particular the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Social Welfare and of Rural Construction, are willing to assume the responsibility for exerting creative leadership in articulating a positive policy for refugees, in delineating administrative responsibility within the cabinet ministries and provincial bureaucracies, and in translating policy into effective programed operations in all areas of need. The U.S. mission in Saigon should redouble its efforts for speedy action by the South Vietnamese Government, and stand ready to assist the Government in meeting the urgent challenge of its distressed citizens.

(4) ON THE ROLE OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

Private voluntary agencies are a traditionally significant channel whereby the American people express their active concern for refugees and others in distress. The situation in South Vietnam is no exception. Many of these agencies initiated programs in the immediate aftermath of the Indochina war and the partition of Vietnam, principally to help care for the refugees from the north. Today, over 30 voluntary agencies and other private organizations operate or contribute to assistance programs in South Vietnam. The current situation has prompted additional agencies to seek out ways of helping to ameliorate the serious need resulting from the military conflict.

Representatives of several agencies appeared before the subcommittee during the course of its hearings. Their activities range from the distribution of emergency relief supplies—food, blankets, clothing, and medicines—to the operating of longer term rehabilitative programs involving self-help, schools, medical clinics, agricultural development, vocational training, recreation, et cetera. Their activities involving refugees, however, are limited chiefly to emergency and custodial relief.

Most of the agencies are registered with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid in AID, and qualify for various types of governmental assistance, including surplus food commodities for distribution to the needy, excess military property, and the reimbursement of ocean freight costs on supplies donated to the agencies by the American people. To facilitate agency programs in South Vietnam, a special liaison office was created in AID in the fall of 1965.

An important link between the agencies and the U.S. Government is the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVA) and its various committees, with headquarters in New York City.

Mr. Waters emphasized that "we welcome and need the great contributions being made by American private organizations in support of humanitarian and developmental activities abroad." He also noted, that "in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Congress reiterated its objective of fostering and expanding the traditional partnership of the Government and the American people in service to distressed humanity. It directed the President to use, to the maximum extent practicable, the services and facilities of voluntary agencies registered with and approved by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. This we have been and are doing." Mr. Waters pointed out that in April 1965 representatives of government met with ACVA members to work out ways of maximizing private efforts in South Vietnam. The subcommittee notes, however, that the continuing political and physical insecurity throughout South Vietnam markedly inhibits the potential of the agencies' contribution.

In their testimony, the representatives of the various voluntary agencies agreed that, in the main, relations between the private sector and AID, as well as the U.S. mission in Saigon, were cordial and correct. However, testimony in the earlier phases of the hearings, especially, did indicate that agency needs, relative to such things as transportation, supplies, and warehousing, were frequently given a low priority by cooperating governmental officials, and that "redtape" often needlessly complicated agency programs or prevented an immediate response to an emergency situation.

Coordination of agency efforts in South Vietnam has been effected, in part, through a Coordinating Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. This committee, which no longer functions as originally conceived, was composed initially of representatives of various private agencies, the United States mission and the South Vietnamese Government. The committee had operated intermittently for some time, and during the late spring and summer of 1965 was reactivated to help focus attention on the growing refugee problem and the need for assistance. This was accomplished in part through the initiative of the voluntary agencies, whose early recognition of a developing refugee problem helped to stimulate activity in the government sector.

Because of its loose and informal arrangement, the committee proved unsatisfactory, and recently has been reorganized with a regular secretariat to permit, among other things, the daily coordination of all agency activities, both with respect to their own individual programs and as between the voluntary agencies and the governments concerned. This badly needed focal point for private humanitarian efforts, is now an established mechanism in the apparatus of assistance to the people of South Vietnam. The many resources and broad experience of the voluntary agencies should be fully tapped. The committee's role should be continually strengthened and its functions broadened—not only because of the present exigencies in South Vietnam and the prospect of continuing war, but also because a terminated conflict will leave a massive task of rehabilitation.

Throughout the summer of 1965, there was a great deal of discussion relative to coordinating private assistance programs in this country and in the field, and to finding better ways for the American people to express their active concern for the distressed citizens of South Vietnam. The consensus in most quarters, including that of the agencies, was the firm belief that the existing institutional framework, in both the private and public sectors, would, with proper encouragement and leadership, be adequate to help meet effectively the urgent needs among the people of South Vietnam. The subcommittee believes, however, that more efforts and new creative ways are needed in the United States, to publicize the urgent humanitarian needs in South Vietnam, and to galvanize public opinion in this country into greater support for humanitarian assistance through voluntary agencies and other private organizations. There has been a marked failure in capturing the attention and positive response of a large segment of the American people in an area of traditional concern to this country.

(5) ON CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The contributions made to civilian relief by the international community were discussed at various intervals during the public hearings. At an early hearing, the chairman expressed a special interest in "attempting to bring together worldwide opinion to support the humanitarian need of the people" in South Vietnam. He expressed the subcommittee's concern that, as the record seemed to indicate, the matter was not being pursued effectively and with the greatest sense of urgency. General Taylor testified, for example, that contributions made by foreign governments were "relatively small." Other testimony indicated that appeals for assistance stimulated expressions of interest, but few substantial contributions.

A general appeal for international assistance—"from divisions of combat troops to pharmaceuticals"—was initiated in late 1964. As Ambassador Unger, Ambassador Lodge, Mr. Poats, and General Taylor testified, the continuing appeal is made through the South Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the several foreign governments represented in Saigon. The U.S. Government has supported this appeal, and in recent months especially, has pursued the matter with many governments. By the end of 1965, contributions in personnel, supplies, and materials were made by the following Governments: Australia, Republic of China, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

As General Taylor testified, the help of these Governments is "highly welcome." But the record would indicate that world opinion has not, in fact, been marshaled effectively to support humanitarian needs in South Vietnam.

(6) ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES RELATIVE TO REFUGEE MOVEMENT

Early in the hearings the chairman expressed the subcommittee's belief that "the movement of refugees within southeast Asia is a fundamental part of the whole effort being made through so-called wars of national liberation." He noted that there have been "a number of incidents" where refugee problems have been exploited and utilized by Communist insurgents to foment instability and to upset a rather delicate internal balance of power within various countries. Certainly this has been true in Laos, and a similar pattern has developed in South Vietnam.

It is difficult to delineate any specific Communist policy or attitude toward refugee movement in South Vietnam. As General Taylor testified, however, "the Vietcong has not hesitated to show their hostility for refugees by attacking refugee centers, as in a recent incident in Binh Dinh Province in central Vietnam." Moreover, the hearings and additional information which has come to the subcommittee, would indicate that in certain situations, Communist forces have actually driven people from their villages and purposefully created a refugee flow, which inevitably contributes to confusion in the countryside and places a heavy strain on Government relief agencies. But General Taylor noted that "there is no conclusive evidence that the Vietcong have adopted this tactic on any systematic basis. Generally speaking, the Vietcong need the peasants to provide foodstuffs and recruits to sustain their guerrilla units, and hence, they try to prevent the population from escaping to Government control."

In response to questions, several witnesses recognized the probability that the refugee movement offers a convenient vehicle for infiltrating Vietcong cadre into Government-controlled areas, including refugee camps. The witnesses indicated, however, that no serious problem of infiltration has arisen thus far in refugee areas.

The relatively successful screening operation by Government officials has helped considerably. Nevertheless, so long as refugees exist in South Vietnam, their abnormal and often confused situation

will continue to be a potential source of unrest and trouble, which the Vietcong may well exploit to their advantage. This potential underscores the political necessity for adequate protection of refugee areas, and for humanitarian programs of relief and rehabilitation.

(7) ON THE CHIEU-HOI PROGRAM

Of some interest to the subcommittee, is the Chieu-Hoi ("open arms") program designed to attract and rehabilitate defectors from among Vietcong military and civilian cadres. It is, in effect, an amnesty program. It has been in operation for some time and has met with limited success, especially in encouraging the return of those who were voluntarily or forcibly taken into Vietcong ranks in recent years. The program operates in each province. It is coordinated at the national level by an appropriate South Vietnamese cabinet ministry. Ambassador Unger, General Taylor, and others, as well, stressed the importance of the Chieu-Hoi program and expressed the belief that it should be expanded, and given more meaning and effectiveness.

Dr. Fishel, who visited Chieu-Hoi camps during the summer of 1965, commented: "I think one generally is surprised by the aimlessness of much that goes on in the camp, by the fact that it is not the kind of planning for these people which would quickly restore them to some useful position in society." His observation is substantiated by additional information that has come to the subcommittee's attention.

The Chieu-Hoi program is essentially a function of the South Vietnamese Government. However, U.S. specialists actively advise the Government. Provincial representatives of the U.S. operations mission directly participate in the rehabilitation phase of caring for, retraining, and resettling of returnees and their families.

There is little doubt that an effective Chieu-Hoi program can play an important role in providing an additional base of popular support for the central government. The record would indicate that additional effort is needed in this area, especially in view of the unfortunate fact that recent South Vietnamese governments have downgraded the importance of this program.

E. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO REFUGEE NEEDS

As noted above, the chaotic situation among refugees during most of last year, reflected a failure on the part of the Government of South Vietnam, and the United States Government as well, to fully anticipate and prepare for an inevitable byproduct of developing insurgency; to identify readily what was clearly a growing and serious problem, and to initiate adequate programs of assistance, commensurate with stated objectives in the nonmilitary phases of the Vietnam conflict. It reflected a weak humanitarian concern for the victims of aggression and conflict. It reflected a lack of earnest activity to expand and strengthen popular allegiance to the government in Saigon, among a significant cross section of the South Vietnamese citizens. It reflected the absence of an overall strategic concept and program which fully integrates the political, economic, and social aspects of the Vietnam conflict with the needed military effort.

Again, as noted above, the subcommittee's inquiry, newspaper articles, and reports by voluntary agency personnel, were catalysts in galvanizing governmental action on behalf of refugees. Several steps have been taken by the U.S. Government since the summer of 1965.

In August and September a field investigation was conducted by the U.S. AID mission in South Vietnam to determine more accurately the nature and scope of the refugee problem and the condition of the displaced persons. This field investigation included a visit to South Vietnam by Dr. Howard Rusk, Director of the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, New York University Medical Center. He went at the request of the President to investigate the kind of programs needed to assist the distressed people of South Vietnam. Moreover, AID personnel were diverted to an ad hoc refugee program office, which was assisted by a number of refugee specialists on a consultative basis. A Washington-based Vietnam refugee relief coordinator was appointed. In October, the Office of Refugee Coordination (ORC) was established in the U.S. AID mission in Saigon to serve as the focal point for the planning and administration of refugee relief and rehabilitation programs. Through an interagency agreement formalized on October 30, 1965, ORC has established working arrangements with other segments of the U.S. mission, including the Army civil affairs teams, the Special Forces, military transportation, and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office. As of January 1, 1966, 14 AID personnel had been assigned to refugee matters. An additional 14 had been recruited and were in the final processing stages in Washington. An additional nine were being recruited.

As late as midsummer 1965, AID made no separate budgetary provision for displaced persons in South Vietnam, although it is probably true that refugees benefited from United States aid programs in several areas. Separate provisions, however, are now made for the

refugees. AID estimates that the U.S. contribution to refugee programs during the current fiscal year is some \$20,900,000—\$11,600,000 in a separate emergency relief program; \$4,100,000 in regular programs estimated as attributable to refugee relief (provincial operations, health and medicine, logistics); and \$5,200,000 in food commodities under titles II and III programs of Public Law 480. Various materials including tin roofing and cement have been allocated to the South Vietnamese Government to assist in constructing needed shelters, classrooms, and dispensaries in many of the 250 refugee centers throughout the country. AID has indicated its intention to initiate and improve long-term self-help and rehabilitation programs among refugees, as distinct from emergency relief.

U.S. budgetary arrangements for refugees have given the subcommittee cause for some concern. For example, AID has been unable to supply the subcommittee with definitive information on expenditures in separate categories such as education, health, or social welfare. Moreover, of the \$11,600,000 allotted this fiscal year for the emergency relief program, some \$10,600,000 had apparently been obligated as of October 31, 1965. The continuing problem of refugees will inevitably require additional expenditures in the emergency relief category during the coming months of the current fiscal year. But subcommittee requests to AID regarding such contingency planning have not produced satisfactory answers, and, given the circumstances in South Vietnam, this may generate the kind of situation which existed during much of 1965, when urgent refugee needs necessitated the diversion of funds and materials from regular but equally needed aid programs. Such unfortunate events must not be repeated. It seems inappropriate to rely on contingency funds to meet obvious necessities in the refugee program during the coming months of the current fiscal year. This reflects an uncertainty regarding the availability of needed funds, a lack of program planning to meet specific needs, and a continued low priority for the needs of the refugees—a significant cross section of South Vietnamese citizens.

The United States mission in Saigon has expressed to the Government of South Vietnam the importance of a viable refugee program. In so doing, AID has made several proposals to the Saigon government: that a central office, or directorate, be established in Saigon for refugee programs; that refugee registration procedures be developed; that refugee housing be improved; that some 1,000 temporary classrooms be constructed in refugee areas; that vocational training be made available to selected refugees; that plans continue for implementing resettlement projects as soon as security conditions permit such activity. As of late January, however, there was little evidence to suggest that the United States mission was being effective in approaching the South Vietnamese Government regarding the refugee problem, and that strong concerted action was being taken in several areas of urgent need. The subcommittee believes the situation reflected, among other factors, a continued lack of creative leadership on the part of AID officials, as well as an apparently low priority given such programs.

Substantial progress has been made, however, in moving emergency supplies into refugee areas. AID reports that during the final quarter of 1965, despite increased Vietcong interdiction of supply routes, the flow of material to refugees is now more than doubled. Hopefully,

this also reflects a higher priority given civilian needs in recent months. AID continues to work with various offices in the United States mission, with the voluntary agencies, and the Government of South Vietnam for better coordination in the movement and distribution of supplies, and for improved warehousing and reporting.

Since early summer of 1965, AID has also sought increased cooperation with voluntary agencies and an expansion of their efforts among the people of South Vietnam. To facilitate these efforts, AID sponsored a seven-man Voluntary Agency Refugee Relief Mission in October of 1965. The relief mission filed a report with the President in November. The report recognized the primary role of government in assisting the dispossessed in South Vietnam, but pledged increased private efforts and stressed the need for a creative partnership between government and the private sector. In recent months several private agencies have carried on fund raising campaigns among the American people, have sought to recruit additional personnel, and have appealed to their sister agencies in the international community to help in providing humanitarian assistance to the people of South Vietnam. AID is encouraging the efforts of the voluntary agencies, and also the efforts of other private organizations, such as labor, business, and civic groups. AID, the Department of State, and the Government of South Vietnam are also working to expand the humanitarian contributions in food commodities, other supplies, and personnel of friendly governments throughout the world.

The subcommittee commends U.S. governmental and private agencies for their greater efforts in assisting the distressed people of South Vietnam. The subcommittee appreciates the tremendous difficulties in the planning and administering of social, economic, and political programs in a country which is simultaneously engaged in repelling Communist-led insurgency and aggression. But the subcommittee believes that no effort should be spared to effect such programs in South Vietnam. In the coming months, this effort should greatly expand, and equal in resolve and resources needed activity on the battlefield. Hopefully, the South Vietnamese Government will fully recognize the serious need for this effort among its people, and, in cooperation with the U.S. mission in Saigon, initiate and effect appropriate programs wherever conditions permit such action.

The subcommittee also commends the members of the international community which have responded to pleas for humanitarian assistance. Hopefully, their contributions will grow in the coming months, and that additional governments, private organizations, and international bodies will express their active concern for the people of South Vietnam.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS

The subcommittee makes the following recommendations:

1. The subcommittee recommends that the United States express greater humanitarian concern for the refugees in South Vietnam and their fellow citizens in distress. Efforts to improve their welfare necessarily complement the military activity. Such efforts will be a basic ingredient in the long haul to preserve and strengthen the political independence of South Vietnam. But those efforts must rival in resolve and resources the needed military effort. They must be more forcefully expressed and more fully integrated into the operation of America's overall strategic concept, which in the past has neglected the importance of economic, social, and political development among the South Vietnamese people. The battles may be won by the military; but the true victory will be won by a people inspired with confidence and hope that the future will bring a better life for themselves and their children.
2. The subcommittee recommends that refugee assistance increasingly emphasize long-term rehabilitation and resettlement. There is an urgent need for meaningful programs which will restore hope in the refugees—indeed, in all the people of South Vietnam—as well as keep them alive. Activity is needed to educate the children, to care for the orphans, and to raise standards of health. Activity is needed to establish cottage industries, cooperative self-help projects, local agricultural development programs, vocational training and general education centers, resettlement villages, and other channels to train idle hands, to encourage industriousness, to stimulate productive life, and achieve active allegiance to the Government. Such programs will contribute to nation building in South Vietnam and the long-term betterment of its citizens.
3. The subcommittee recommends that programs for economic and social development be coupled with efforts to encourage the growth of rudimentary, but viable democratic political action within the refugee centers. Elected councils within the centers, closely tied to the existing political structure could reflect and serve the interests of the dispossessed at the provincial and national levels of the South Vietnamese Government. The meaning and experience of creative and democratic political activity cannot be minimized in a country where the concepts of nationhood, and of a national government responding to individual needs and legitimate demands for social change, are novel and without tradition.
4. The subcommittee recommends that greater efforts be made by U.S. officials to stimulate a very active and creative concern for the people of South Vietnam on the part of the government in Saigon. New ways must be explored to induce the South Vietnamese Government to drop its lethargy toward refugees and others in distress. Because of the highly political nature of the conflict in South Vietnam, it is mandatory that the Government not be satisfied with military measures alone. A responsive government will care for and protect

refugees, and institute reform and economic development to alleviate the popular grievances upon which insurgency feeds. South Vietnam needs quick-impact and easily discernible reforms, and appropriate psychological action campaigns. The Government must involve as many of the people as possible—including the refugees, a significant cross section of South Vietnamese citizens. U.S. assistance programs for refugees and their fellow citizens should be implemented as much as possible through the South Vietnamese Government. The U.S. role should be essentially indirect and supportive, in order to help strengthen and encourage the Government in expanding its presence and control in the countryside. To assure that U.S. assistance will be used promptly, effectively, and economically, the subcommittee believes that additional coordinating and operating procedures must be developed within both Governments and between them.

5. The subcommittee recommends that the United States encourage and assist a greater effort in short-term programs for the training of South Vietnamese specialists in social welfare, public health, agricultural development, and other fields. Special efforts should be made in encouraging the South Vietnamese Government to involve the university students of South Vietnam, and to enlist their talent, in the task of meeting the needs of their fellow citizens and their country.

6. The subcommittee recommends that the seriousness and importance of the refugee problem, and America's deep humanitarian concern for the plight of these people, be reflected in the presence of a refugee official at the highest policymaking level of the U.S. mission in Saigon. This official should be responsible only to the Ambassador and the President. He should be directly involved in all decisions, whether military or civilian, concerning refugees. He should be coordinator of all assistance efforts by the American people, through their government or private voluntary agencies.

7. The subcommittee recommends that officials in the executive branch consider the establishment of a highly motivated, professional corps to serve in a civilian counterinsurgency establishment as a complement to the Special Forces in the military. The political, economic, and social services of such a specially constituted corps are urgently needed among the refugees in South Vietnam and their fellow citizens, and among the people of other countries threatened with Communist insurgency.

8. The subcommittee recommends that greater efforts be made to enlist the support of the international community, including inter-governmental organizations, in providing humanitarian assistance to the people of South Vietnam. World opinion, in both the private and public sectors, has not been marshaled effectively by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments. Contributions in trained personnel, equipment, and supplies are immediately needed to help ameliorate the serious educational, medical, social, and economic needs among the refugees and their fellow citizens in distress.

9. The subcommittee recommends that appropriate consideration be given to the establishment of a special international force of qualified personnel to assist in the development of southeast Asia. The presence of men and women whose only concern is the health of the people, the education of children, the teaching of simple technology, and the training of civilian administrators would make important contributions to economic and social developments, and to the

political stability of southeast Asia. Such a force would enroll citizens of many countries, but especially those in Asia. Its activities would compliment and encourage existing developmental programs, and action contemplated by the recently established Asian Development Bank. The international force would appropriately fall under United Nations auspices, but also encourage the participation and partnership of nongovernmental organizations throughout the world. The military conflict in South Vietnam should not hinder a free discussion on establishing an international force for development in Asia. What an international force cannot immediately and fully accomplish in South Vietnam, should, nevertheless, be undertaken in other countries of Asia at an early date.

10. The subcommittee recommends that every effort be made to strengthen and facilitate the role of voluntary agencies and other private organizations in assisting the dispossessed in South Vietnam. Because specialists in refugee work are urgently needed, the subcommittee recommends that the U.S. Government subsidize the travel and salary costs of agencies willing to recruit additional personnel. The subcommittee also recommends that every consideration be given by U.S. officials to providing capital facilities for hospitals, clinics, schools, resettlement villages, and similar facilities, which individual voluntary agencies could operate and support. Such contracting programs effectively operate elsewhere, notably in Hong Kong. A similar pattern should be encouraged in those areas of South Vietnam where security conditions and need make it possible and desirable.

11. The subcommittee recommends that leaders in the private sector, in cooperation with appropriate officials in government, should establish an officially recognized and special operating committee of leading Americans to help publicize the urgent needs in South Vietnam, and to galvanize public opinion in this country into greater support for humanitarian assistance through private organizations. The religious and nonsectarian voluntary agencies—as well as interested civic organizations, labor unions, business groups, and other bodies—furnish a ready mechanism whereby the American people, through contributions in funds and kind, may express their deep sympathy and active concern for the plight of those who suffer in South Vietnam. The American people should be more effectively encouraged to participate in this humanitarian offensive. Thus far, there has been a marked failure in capturing the attention and positive response of a large segment of the American people in an area of traditional concern to this country.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. KENNEDY

Recent developments prompt me to add this additional statement to the report unanimously approved by the subcommittee. My brief comments cover two areas of concern—the current status of the refugee program and the use of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as channels of assistance for the dispossessed in South Vietnam.

On February 11, 1966, the subcommittee met to hear a report on the refugee program by Mr. Edward B. Marks, who heads the Office of Refugee Coordination of the U.S. AID mission in Saigon. Mr. Marks had returned to Washington for several days of consultation. He was accompanied to the hearing by Mr. George Goss, AID refugee program coordinator in Washington. The hearing followed the Honolulu conference between President Johnson and South Vietnamese leaders, whose joint communique specifically recognized the important need of a substantive program among the refugees in South Vietnam.

The hearing indicated, however, that while some progress had been made over the past few months in developing a viable policy and program for the refugees, it was also true that the task had only begun, and that a needed sense of urgency and creative direction in this matter was not clearly in evidence, especially on the part of the South Vietnamese Government. After more than 7 months of continuous activity there is, in fact, little evidence to suggest that the governments involved have moved significantly beyond a backstopping position in providing care and protection to the refugees—even in the immediate area of emergency and short-term custodial relief.

This is illustrated by the tenor of Mr. Marks' testimony, which emphasized intention and hope, rather than actualities and progress, and by his comment that "we are giving our attention first to getting the most urgent supplies up to the refugees, and to getting the Government (South Vietnamese) to really focus attention on the problem. * * *". The fact that this situation continues to exist, gives me cause for serious concern, which I am sure is shared by my colleagues on the subcommittee.

The testimony of Mr. Marks and Mr. Goss provided no assurance that adequate personnel existed in the U.S. mission's office of refugee coordination to supplement adequately the limited activities of South Vietnamese officials, or to engage in planning and the estimating of future contingencies involving refugees. Additionally, in spite of the large number of refugee children and orphans, there are no specialists in child welfare, for example, and, in contrast to the military, regular AID and refugee personnel are not stationed below the Provincial level of the South Vietnamese Government.

Moreover, the testimony made clear that most of the current planning for refugees is still based on informal estimates regarding the nature and scope of the refugee problem. There is, for example, no

accurate information on the number of refugee camps or centers. Little has been done in the way of surveys to determine more accurately refugee needs in housing, medical care, and education. In the area of education, Mr. Marks candidly stated that he did not know at this point whether the U.S. mission's proposal to the South Vietnamese Government regarding the number of needed temporary classrooms, was in fact a "valid one."

My response to this statement, and to the many similar statements made before the subcommittee over the last 7 months, is simply this—how can we talk about solving a refugee problem if we do not know, or cannot develop, information on the needs of the refugees?

The continued ad hoc nature of refugee operations and the absence of an overall viable policy toward the refugee problem is most clearly reflected in the lack of definitive budgetary information on the part of both AID and the South Vietnamese Government. Beyond emergency and short-term custodial relief, there are apparently no priorities currently given to substantive programs in education, cottage industries, vocational training, resettlement, and the like, even though in education, for example, the percentage of nonrefugee children in school exceeds that of the refugee children by nearly 50 percent. There has also been scant attention paid to refugee political action programs, which are recognized as possible and desirable in an effort to broaden and strengthen allegiance to the South Vietnamese Government among a significant cross section of its citizens.

Although the South Vietnamese Government has introduced some flexibility into its operation, in the main, it is still operating through the same diffuse and cumbersome machinery which existed many months ago. It has done little to recruit and train additional cadre to carry out a viable refugee program in the field. Moreover, little action to enforce whatever national decisions are made, has been taken in the provinces, where the province chiefs continue to make the final decisions regarding provisions for refugee assistance.

There is little doubt in my mind that the resolve present on the battlefield is not yet present in the equally important task of nation building and development—in educating the children; in caring for the orphans; in raising standards of health; in establishing cottage industries, vocational training centers, and agricultural programs; and in eradicating popular grievances on which insurgency feeds. I am hopeful that the Honolulu Conference declarations will have finally generated on the part of both Governments the sense of urgency and resolute action which is needed in all these areas. The task of building in a country besieged by war and violent internal conflict, is admittedly difficult. But without this effort the military venture will not fully achieve its final end, to safeguard and strengthen the political independence of South Vietnam.

The civilian needs in South Vietnam are so great and so immediate, that all possible channels of assistance should be explored and, hopefully, utilized. One of the greatest untapped sources of assistance, with a pool of trained personnel experienced in humanitarian and developmental activities, is the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

In the past few months I have made special efforts to explore the alternatives in this area. I firmly believe a strengthened United Nations presence in South Vietnam is possible and desirable—in both emergency and longer term developmental programs.

On February 7, I met with several officials at the United Nations, including Secretary General U Thant; Under Secretary C. V. Narasimhan; Miss Julia Henderson, Director of the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs; Mr. Paul G. Hoffman of the U.N. development program; Mr. Sherwood Moe of UNICEF; and Dr. Arthur Gagliotti of UNESCO. Earlier, I held conversations with Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and had informal contacts with representatives of the World Health Organization.

All of these officials expressed a deep and sincere humanitarian concern for the plight of refugees and their fellow citizens in South Vietnam, and a willingness to consider various social and economic programs to benefit these distressed people. Those offices currently sponsoring small pilot programs in South Vietnam—the development program, UNICEF, and UNESCO—replied affirmatively to the idea of expanding their programs.

UNESCO could contribute significantly to the training of teachers and the strengthening of South Vietnam's educational system. The World Health Organization could do similarly in the field of medicine. UNICEF could operate feeding centers for children, especially for the orphans and refugees, and provide a variety of services in the field of family and child welfare. The Bureau of Social Affairs could help establish training centers for social workers and other personnel. The development program could assist in several areas, including welfare services, community facilities, and agricultural development.

I have reported my conversations with the various United Nations officials to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and members of his staff. I have also met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other officials in the Department of State.

I believe that our Government, in cooperation with the Government of South Vietnam, and other parties as well, especially among the countries of Asia, should immediately consider the alternatives open at the United Nations for humanitarian and developmental programs for the people of South Vietnam. Recognizing the hope and meaning which such programs can bring to southeast Asia, no time should be lost in preparing positive programs of emergency assistance and longer term development for consideration by agencies at the United Nations. I feel certain these agencies would assist in this preparation.

The Governments of the United States and South Vietnam can ill afford to neglect the alternatives for humanitarian assistance and economic and social development which exist at the United Nations. This is especially true in view of our recent action in the Security Council, and of our repeated recognition that the United Nations does, indeed, have a legitimate concern with all aspects of the conflict in Vietnam. I believe our efforts in the United Nations in behalf of the people of Vietnam and their hope for the future, would lend even greater credence to our sincere desire for peace. A strengthened civilian presence of the United Nations in South Vietnam may well lead to additional activity in this direction.

EDWARD M. KENNEDY.

APPENDIX

The following witnesses appeared before the subcommittee:

Cary, Stephen G., assistant executive director, American Friends Service Committee.
Cherne, Leo, chairman, International Rescue Committee.
Cherney, Paul, director, International Social Service, American branch.
Daly, Thomas A., secretary and general counsel, People to People Health Foundation, Inc.
Fischel, Dr. Wesley R., professor of political science, Michigan State University.
Goffio, Frank L., executive director, CARE.
Hilsman, Roger, professor of government, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
Hostetter, Dr. C. N., Jr., chairman, Mennonite Central Committee, Akron, Pa., accompanied by Wilbert Shenk.
Johnstone, Larry, summer intern, Agency for International Development.
Klein, Wells, consultant, International Rescue Committee.
Lambie, James M., assistant director, CARE.
Lodge, Hon. Henry Cabot, Ambassador-designate to South Vietnam, accompanied by Earl Young, operations officer on Vietnam desk, Agency for International Developments.
Luce, Donald, chief of party in Vietnam, International Voluntary Services, accompanied by Arthur Z. Gardiner, executive director.
Marks, Edward B., director, office of refugee coordination, U.S. AID mission, Saigon, accompanied by George Goss, AID refugee program coordinator, Washington.
McCarthy, Msgr. John F., assistant executive director, Catholic Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference.
McCracken, James, executive director, Church World Service, accompanied by Pastor Viggo Mollerop, executive secretary, Danish Interchurch Aid, Copenhagen, Denmark.
McNaughton, Hon. John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Navarro, Edmundo G., U.S. operations mission, Vietnam.
Poats, Rutherford M., Assistant Administrator for Far East, Agency for International Development.
Reed, Dr. John, special assistant to the Chief of the Far East Health Branch, Agency for International Development, and commissioned officer, U.S. Public Health Service.
Ross, George, Jr., deputy executive director, Foster Parents Plan, Inc.
Ruoff, Edward, U.S. operations mission, Vietnam.
Stockton, Carl, educational leader in Vietnam, International Voluntary Services, Inc., accompanied by Arthur Z. Gardiner, executive director.
Stoneman, Walter G., Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development.

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., former Ambassador to South Vietnam.
Unger, Leonard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State.
Walsh, Dr. William B., chairman, Project Vietnam, People to People
Health Foundation, Inc.
Waters, Herbert J., Assistant Administrator for Material Resources,
Agency for International Development.
Whitfield, Danny, U.S. operations mission, Vietnam.
Wilson, Dr. R. Norris, executive vice president, U.S. Committee for
Refugees.

